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Abstract This paper examines the effects of predatory lending laws in the
cities of Chicago and Philadelphia. The level of mortgage
activity in each of the cities is compared during the pre- and
post-legislative periods relative to other parts of the state to
assess the impact of localized legislation. In Chicago, where the
predatory lending law focused on banks, a subprime origination
in the city was found to be more likely to be made by a non-
bank after the passage of the law. In Philadelphia, however,
where the predatory legislation was aimed at all ﬁnancial service
providers, a decline was observed in the likelihood of a subprime
loan being originated in the city during the post-legislation
period, with the minority and low-income market segments
experiencing the largest reduction.
Introduction
Over the past decade the subprime mortgage market grew dramatically, increasing
from $34 billion in 1994 to over $160 billion in 1999.1 Concurrent with this
expansion, there is a growing body of anecdotal evidence suggesting that a subset
of lenders involved in the subprime market are engaging in abusive or ‘‘predatory’’
lending practices. To deal with these abuses, regulators recently implemented
revisions to Regulation Z, a disclosure law that increased the number of loans
covered by the Home Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).2 These revisions to
HOEPA, however, did not prohibit any lending practices. In recent months,
however, several states and cities have gone beyond increased disclosure and
implemented legislation that prohibits or penalizes certain ‘‘predatory practices.’’3
Federal policymakers have also proposed legislation on predatory lending that
would preempt state laws and prohibit certain predatory practices on a nationwide
basis.4
This study examines the impact of predatory lending legislation in two cities,
Chicago and Philadelphia, which were the ﬁrst to enact predatory lending laws.
Because subprime lenders tend to focus their activity in low-income and minority480  Harvey and Nigro
applicant areas, examining the impact of predatory legislation in these two cities
is extremely important.5 In Chicago, the impact of the predatory lending law on
both borrowers and lenders in that city is examined relative to other borrowers in
the state from the pre- to post-legislation period. The impact of the city of
Philadelphia’s predatory lending ordinance on subprime lending in the city is also
examined, although the law was later rescinded by state-level legislation.
Philadelphia is included because according to popular press reports the passage
of the law led several lenders to exit the city.6
The study focuses on several important questions. First, did the restrictions
imposed in Chicago and Philadelphia affect the availability of credit to subprime
borrowers? Second, if so, what types of borrowers and lenders felt the greatest
impact? Finally, given that the laws have different restrictions and penalties, how
did they affect different types of lenders? It should be noted from the outset,
however, that the data do not permit us to ascertain what part of any decline in
mortgage lending was predatory in nature. The data employed in the study do not
have information on pricing or other terms of the loans, and even if they did it
would have required a value judgment to decide whether these terms were onerous
enough to consider the loans to be predatory.7 Although it is very likely the
predatory lending laws reduced or eliminated some predatory practices,
policymakers need also be concerned about their impact on legitimate subprime
lending.
The article is organized as follows. First there is a review of the literature on
subprime and predatory lending. Second, there is a brief overview of the Chicago
and Philadelphia predatory legislation. Third, there is a description of the data and
descriptive statistics on mortgage lending activity in Chicago and Philadelphia
compared to the rest of Illinois and Pennsylvania, respectively. Fourth, empirical
tests examine the changes in mortgage ﬂows following the implementation of the
city-level predatory lending laws. Speciﬁcally, the impact of the legislation on
denial probabilities and changes in the likelihood of a loan being originated by a
subprime versus a traditional lender, or a bank (depository) versus a non-bank
lender are examined. Fifth, the results of the multivariate analysis are discussed.
Finally, there is a summary conclusion with policy implications and areas of future
research.
 Literature Review
The term predatory lending, while commonly used, does not have a unique or
agreed upon deﬁnition. Engel and McCoy (2001), however, broadly deﬁne a
predatory loan as one that meets one or more of the following conditions: loans
with no net beneﬁt to the borrower, loans designed to earn supranormal proﬁts,
loans involving fraud or deceptive practices, loans involving other misleading
nondisclosures that are nevertheless legal and loans that require the borrower to
waive meaningful redress. Some of these practices include high points, high
interest rates, high or duplicative closing costs and fees, loan-to-value ratios (LTV)Predatory Lending Laws  481
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in excess of 100% of the underlying collateral, loan ﬂippings, loan steering,
excessive prepayment penalties, abusive collection and foreclosure practices and
loan features such as negative amortization, balloon payments and unnecessary
credit insurance.8
Loans with high interest rates, however, are not all necessarily predatory in nature.
The higher interest rates charged on these loans may simply reﬂect higher risks
and costs associated with ‘‘subprime’’ lending. Subprime loans are higher rate
loans designed for borrowers with impaired or limited credit histories that make
it difﬁcult for them to secure credit from the prime market or traditional lenders.9
Lenders argue that these higher rates are justiﬁed by the need to be compensated
for the greater risk that these borrowers pose.10 They also argue that the higher
rates charged reﬂect a lack of standardization in underwriting that makes it more
costly to originate and service loans to borrowers with blemished credit histories,
limited discretionary income and cash-ﬂow concerns.11 Predatory lenders,
however, may be deﬁned as those that go beyond risk-based pricing and set loan
terms high above what is necessary to offset costs and earn a return that
compensates them for their risk. Given the lack of publicly available information
on loan terms and practices, however, it is very difﬁcult to distinguish between
the two. It is generally agreed, however, that predatory lenders constitute a
segment of the subprime market.
A signiﬁcant amount of research on subprime lending activity has been conducted
at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) where for the past
several years researchers have compiled a list of subprime lenders.12 Using this
list, HUD and other researchers have documented the high rates of subprime
lending in low-income and minority communities. For example, in 2000, HUD
issued a report entitled ‘‘Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparities in
Subprime Lending in America’’ documenting the concentration of these lenders
in low-income and minority communities in ﬁve cities including Atlanta, Los
Angeles, Baltimore, New York and Chicago. They found that subprime loans were
three times more likely in low-income neighborhoods than in high-income
neighborhoods and ﬁve times more likely in black neighborhoods than in white
neighborhoods. More recently, the Bradford (2002) study on subprime lending
patterns in all of the nation’s 331 metropolitan areas found that there are
‘‘widespread’’ racial disparities in subprime lending activity nationwide, and the
top six areas with the most widespread disparities are all in California.13
Several other researchers have examined subprime lending. Immergluck (1999)
focused on the growth rate of subprime lending in Chicago’s minority and low-
income community. He found that prime lenders active in white and upper-income
communities tended to be less active in minority and lower-income neighborhoods
and that subprime lenders have ﬁlled this vacuum. Marsico (2001) examined 1999
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for New York and found similar
patterns with subprime lenders having a greater presence in low-income and
minority communities. Finally, Canner, Passmore and Laderman (1999)
demonstrated that subprime lenders are oriented more toward low-income and482  Harvey and Nigro
minority applicants and that changes in denial rates over the 1993 to 1998 time
period can be partially attributed to the increase in the number of subprime
lenders.
Two more recent papers, Elliehausen and Staten (2002) and Harvey and Nigro
(2002), examined the impact of the North Carolina predatory lending law on
access to credit. The North Carolina legislation was the ﬁrst state-level predatory
lending law in the United States. Although the authors employed different data
sources, they arrived at similar conclusions. Using 1998-2000 HMDA data,
Harvey and Nigro found that the North Carolina law reduced the overall level of
subprime mortgage lending activity and that the impact of the legislation was
different by both the type of ﬁnancial service provider and borrower. Speciﬁcally,
they found that non-bank subprime lending contracted faster in North Carolina
when compared to the control group, while minority applicants were also less
likely to get loans following the legislation. Also, Elliehausen and Staten found
that the North Carolina law signiﬁcantly reduced the supply of subprime credit.
This study extends Elliehausen and Staten (2002) and Harvey and Nigro (2002)
by examining the impact of local legislation passed in the cities of Chicago and
Philadelphia. This is the ﬁrst study to examine city-level predatory lending
legislation. Second, given the focus of the laws in each of the two cities, several
unique hypotheses are presented that are speciﬁc to the city legislation.
 Predatory Lending Laws in Chicago and Philadelphia
Chicago became the ﬁrst city in the nation to impose sanctions on predatory
lending when the City Council’s ﬁnance committee passed an ordinance in August
2000.14 Chicago’s ordinance deﬁnes predatory loans as mortgages that have
interest rates ﬁve percentage points or more higher than the yield on U.S. Treasury
securities of comparable maturities.15 The council blamed these types of loans for
a rise in foreclosures and, by extension, in crime in and around vacant lots that
can result from foreclosures.16 Unlike other proposed federal and implemented
state predatory initiatives, however, the focus of the Chicago law was on bank
lenders, their mortgage subsidiaries, as well as banks buying ‘‘predatory’’ loans
from a third party.17 Speciﬁcally, the predatory ordinance bars the city of Chicago
from investing any of its $1 billion of municipal funds at banks with predatory
loans on their books and from doing other business with such banks. Furthermore,
the ordinance requires that banks acting as depositories for municipal funds certify
that they do not fund predatory loans. It also requires a similar certiﬁcation from
banks that have other city contracts.18 The Chicago Department of Housing and
Mayors ofﬁce believed that this leverage would promote good practices and
responsible lending.
The Philadelphia predatory lending ordinance was passed in April 2001 and many
believe that it was one of the toughest efforts aimed at eliminating predatory
practices. The Philadelphia ordinance subjects ‘‘threshold’’ loans, deﬁned as thosePredatory Lending Laws  483
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with rates 4.5 to 6.5 percentage points above Treasury securities of comparable
maturity, to stringent restrictions and imposes even harsher penalties on ‘‘high-
cost’’ loans, those with rates 6.5 percentage points over comparable Treasuries.
These penalties include cash ﬁnes or loss of the city’s investment business
depending on the terms and conditions. Furthermore, the Philadelphia ordinance
also forces all lenders, even banks and credit unions that are exempt from some
other provisions, to ﬁle disclosures with the city outlining the annual percentage
rate and the points charged on each loan. Lenders in the city argued that the
ordinance would make it harder for people with poor credit histories to get a loan
and may force lenders to leave the market.19 Lobbying by mortgage ﬁnancial
service providers in Philadelphia was eventually successful. On June 21, 2001,
the Pennsylvania industry supported bill HB 1703 and provisions were enacted,
including those preempting the Philadelphia predatory ordinance, but not before
several lenders exited the city. Thus, this study attempts to determine if the passage
and later repeal of the Philadelphia law had any impact on subprime lending.
 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The Data
Quarterly HMDA data was collected for Illinois and Pennsylvania. In
Pennsylvania, observations for the third and fourth quarters of 2000 and 2001
constitute the pre-law and post-law samples, respectively. Similarly, the Illinois
pre-law sample includes the fourth quarter of 1999 and ﬁrst quarter of 2000, and
the post-law sample includes these identical quarters for the following year.20
Matching the quarterly periods in each year controls for seasonal trends in
mortgage application volume. The action date on the application is used to place
observations in the quarterly groupings. For both samples the observations for the
cities where laws were enacted, Philadelphia and Chicago, are compared with a
control group of observations for the rest of the state.
The HUD subprime lender list was used to identify lenders whose principal
business is subprime lending.21 Low-income applicants are deﬁned as those with
annual incomes of less than $25,000 as reported in HMDA data, while the
minority grouping includes Black and Hispanic applicants. The race analysis
includes only Caucasian, Black or Hispanic applications. Withdrawn applications
are not included in the denial rate calculations, but are included in all other areas
of the analysis.
Chicago Loan Originations
Panels A1 and A2 of Exhibit 1 detail the number of loan originations in Illinois
and Pennsylvania, respectively. The panels provide a breakdown of the




























Low Income (%)a Minority
Percentage
Minority (%)b
Panel A1: Illinois Total
Originations
Chicago
Pre-law 34,417 7,399 21.50 27,018 78.50 2,477 7.56 14,653 51.16
Post-law 42,808 6,026 14.08 36,782 85.92 1,665 4.21 15,698 44.13
Change 8,391 1,373 7.42 9,764 7.42 812 3.35 1,045 7.03
Control Group
Pre-law 115,790 13,675 11.81 102,115 88.19 6,447 5.76 15,912 16.33
Post-law 161,280 11,607 7.20 149,673 92.80 5,643 3.75 20,163 15.00
Change 45,490 2,068 4.61 47,558 4.61 804 2.01 4,251 1.33
Growth Rates:
Chicago 24.38% 18.56% 36.14% 32.78% 7.13%
Control Group 39.29% 15.12% 46.57% 12.47% 26.72%
Difference 14.91% 3.43% 10.43% 20.31% 19.58%
Panel A2: Pennsylvania Total
Originations
Philadelphia 51,359 7,488 14.58 43,871 85.42 4,617 9.33 6,592 17.21
Pre-law 85,317 6,857 78,460 91.96 3,732 4.76 6,489 10.29
Post-law 33,958 631 6.54 34,589 6.54 885 4.57 103 6.92
Change
Control Group
Pre-law 90,549 12,478 13.78 78,071 86.22 10,023 11.34 3,560 5.11
Post-law 147,076 13,714 9.32 133,362 90.68 10,428 7.50 4,030 3.59













































Exhibit 1  (continued)
Loan Originations by Market Segment in the Pre- and Post-Legislation Periods
Total Percentage Percentage Low Percentage Percentage
Orig. Subprime Subprime (%) Prime Prime (%) Income Low Income (%)a Minority Minority (%)b
Panel A2: Pennsylvania Total (continued)
Growth Rates:
Philadelphia 66.12% 8.43% 78.84% 19.17% 1.56%
Control Group 62.43% 9.91% 70.82% 4.04% 13.20%
Difference 3.69% 18.33% 8.02% 23.21% 14.76%
Panel B1: Illinois Subprime Market
Originations
Chicago 1,080 15.21 4,543 80.87
Pre-law 505 9.05 3,584 76.94
Post-law 575 6.16 959 3.93
Change
Control Group
Pre-law 1,574 11.94 3,436 34.46
Post-law 974 8.98 2,918 35.47
Change 600 2.96 518 1.01
Growth Rates
Chicago 53.24% 21.11%



















Exhibit 1  (continued)
Loan Originations by Market Segment in the Pre- and Post-Legislation Periods
Total Percentage Percentage Low Percentage Percentage
Orig. Subprime Subprime (%) Prime Prime (%) Income Low Income (%)a Minority Minority (%)b
Panel B2: Pennsylvania Subprime Market
Originations
Philadelphia 1,500 20.71 1,817 40.79
Pre-law 628 9.82 883 23.45
Post-law 872 10.89 934 17.34
Change
Control Group
Pre-law 2,541 20.85 752 11.11
Post-law 1,749 13.18 566 8.65
Change 792 7.67 186 2.46
Growth Rates
Philadelphia 58.13% 51.40%
Control Group 31.17% 24.73%
Difference 26.96% 26.67%
Panel C1: Illinois Prime Market
Originations
Chicago 1,397 5.44 10,110 43.91
Pre-law 1,160 3.42 12,114 39.18
Post-law 237 2.02 2,004 4.73
Change
Control Group
Pre-law 4,873 4.94 12,476 14.26
Post-law 4,669 3.35 17,245 13.67













































Exhibit 1  (continued)
Loan Originations by Market Segment in the Pre- and Post-Legislation Periods
Total Percentage Percentage Low Percentage Percentage
Orig. Subprime Subprime (%) Prime Prime (%) Income Low Income (%)a Minority Minority (%)b
Panel C1: Prime Market
Growth Rates
Chicago 16.96% 19.82%
Control Group 4.19% 38.23%
Difference 12.78% 18.40%
Panel C2: Pennsylvania Prime Market
Originations
Philadelphia 3,117 7.38 4,775 14.11
Pre-law 3,104 4.31 5,606 9.46
Post-law 13 3.07 831 4.65
Change
Control Group
Pre-law 7,482 9.82 2,808 4.46
Post-law 8,697 6.90 3,464 3.28
Change 1,215 2.92 656 1.18
Growth Rates
Philadelphia 0.42% 17.40%
Control Group 16.24% 23.36%
Difference 16.66% 5.96%
Notes:
a Applications with missing income information are excluded in calculating the low-income share, but are included in the Total Originations column.
b Only black, Hispanic and white applicants are included in the calculation of minority shares. All applicant races are included in the Total Originations
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legislation periods. The data in Panel A show that subprime lending declined
signiﬁcantly in Illinois in the post-legislation period as compared to the prior year,
and that this lending declined slightly faster in Chicago than in the rest of the
state. Chicago subprime originations declined by 18.6% compared with a 15.1%
decline in the control group, or a 3.4% difference in growth rates. These subprime
growth rates were compared with those that occurred in the prime market to put
the subprime changes in context. This comparison reveals that Chicago
experienced a larger relative contraction in the prime market than in the subprime
market. Prime market lending expanded in both groups in the post-legislation
period. In this market, Chicago lending grew slower than in the control group,
with a 10.4% difference in growth rates. This compares with the smaller 3.4%
difference in the subprime market, and suggests that the Chicago predatory lending
law did not reduce the total volume of subprime lending in the city in 2001
compared with the control group. Since the law’s provisions are expected to have
a unique impact on bank (depository) lenders, the lending volumes for these
lenders are examined separately in a later section.
Panel A1 of Exhibit 1 shows that both low-income and minority lending shares
declined in Chicago compared with the control group. Panels B1 and C1 provide
the results for the subprime and prime markets, respectively, which puts the
changes in the subprime market into context. The results for minority lending are
consistent with the overall sample, with subprime lending contracting less slowly
than prime lending. In the prime market, minority lending expanded more slowly
in Chicago than in the control group, with a difference in growth rates of 18.4%.
In the subprime market, however, this gap was only 6.0%. Low-income applicants
in the Chicago subprime market did not beneﬁt from the relatively slower decline
in overall subprime as compared to prime lending. For the low-income group, the
relative declines in lending occurred in both the prime and subprime markets in
similar magnitudes, with negative growth rate differentials in the Chicago markets
of 15.1% and 12.8%, respectively. These comparisons suggest low-income
applicants fared worse than minority applicants in the Chicago subprime market.
This difference in relative lending declines is explored in the empirical models
developed later.
Philadelphia Loan Originations
Unlike the Chicago results, the data in Panel A2 in Exhibit 1 show a large decline
in subprime lending in Philadelphia compared to the control group in the post-
legislation period. Philadelphia subprime originations declined by 8.4% compared
to an increase of 9.9% in the rest of the state, or an 18.3% difference in growth
rates. Conversely, in the prime market Philadelphia lending grew 8.0% faster than
in the rest of the state.
Not surprisingly, since low-income and minority applicants are over-represented
in the subprime market, the shift in subprime lending had an especially large
impact on these market segments. Panel A2 in Exhibit 1 shows that total lendingPredatory Lending Laws  489
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to low-income applicants in Philadelphia declined by 19.2% while low-income
lending increased by 4.0% in the rest of the state. Similarly, minority lending in
Philadelphia declined by 1.6% compared to an increase of 13.2% in the rest of
the state.
Panels B2 and C2 in Exhibit 1 conﬁrm that these relative declines in low-income
and minority lending were most severe in the subprime market segment. Subprime
low-income lending declined by 58.1% in Philadelphia compared to a 31.2%
decline in the control group, for a 26.9% difference in growth rates. Subprime
minority lending declined by 51.4% in Philadelphia compared to a 24.7% decline
in the control group, for a 26.7% difference in growth rates. These growth rate
differentials are much higher than those that occurred in the prime market, which
were 16.7% and 6.0% respectively. Overall the data suggest that the Philadelphia
predatory lending law may have reduced subprime lending volumes in the city
compared to the rest of the state, and that this decline had an especially large
impact on low-income and minority loan applicants.
Denial Rates
Exhibit 2 provides loan denial rates in each market in the pre- and post-legislation
periods. Panel A shows the Illinois results while Panel B provides these data for
the Pennsylvania market.
Panel A in Exhibit 2 shows that for the total market the changes in denial rates
were nearly identical in Chicago and the control group. The data also show that
that the denial rate changes that occurred in Chicago and the control group were
very similar in both the subprime and prime markets.
Panel B in Exhibit 2 shows that in Pennsylvania denial rates declined overall. The
denial rate decline in the total market in Philadelphia of 5.12% was greater than
that in the rest of the state (3.18%). Examining the prime and subprime markets
separately reveals that this relative decline was driven by the prime market results.
In the subprime market, however, denial rates in Philadelphia increased slightly
more than in the rest of the state (6.7% vs. 6.3%).
Number of Lenders and Loans by Type of Lender
The changes in the number of lenders active in each market were examined, as
well as loan originations by type of lender. Panels A and B of Exhibit 3 provide
data on the number of lenders in the Illinois and Pennsylvania markets,
respectively. Panels A and B of Exhibit 4 provide a breakdown of loan origination
volume by lender type in the subprime markets for each geography, and Panels
C and D of Exhibit 4 provide these data for the prime markets.
Panel A in Exhibit 3 shows that there was no signiﬁcant post-legislation change
in the total number of lenders or number of subprime lenders active in the Chicago490  Harvey and Nigro
Exhibit 2  Denial Rates by Market Segment in the Pre- and Post-Legislation Periods
Market Total Applications (%) Subprime (%) Prime (%) Low Income (%) Minority (%)
Panel A: Illinois
Chicago
Pre-law 33.86 51.99 22.95 48.90 36.90
Post-law 28.77 53.47 19.99 52.61 33.74
Change 5.09 1.48 2.96 3.71 3.16
Control Group
Pre-law 25.62 52.22 17.43 43.78 33.21
Post-law 20.31 53.67 14.16 42.24 27.52
Change 5.31 1.45 3.27 1.54 5.69
Panel B: Pennsylvania
Philadelphia
Pre-law 29.65 53.90 20.91 46.42 32.48
Post-law 24.53 60.57 15.27 53.18 27.00
Change 5.12 6.67 5.64 6.76 5.48
Control Group
Pre-law 30.06 52.26 22.63 44.22 32.88
Post-law 26.88 58.53 17.63 46.70 31.25
Change 3.18 6.27 5.00 2.48 1.63
market compared with the rest of the state. There also was no signiﬁcant change
in the fraction of lenders that were bank-afﬁliated in each market. Turning to loan
origination volume, however, the data for subprime volume in Panel A of Exhibit
4 demonstrate a shift away from bank lending in Chicago as compared with the
rest of the state. The share of subprime loans originated by bank-afﬁliated lenders
in Chicago declined to 45.4% from 49.0%, or 3.6%. In the control group, the
bank-afﬁliated share increased by 1.1%. Panel A3 shows that the opposite shift
occurred in the prime market, where the Chicago bank-afﬁliated share contracted
only 0.7% compared to a 2.4% reduction in the control group. These data are
consistent with the Chicago law having a unique impact on bank-afﬁliated lenders.
Similar to the Chicago results, Panel B of Exhibit 3 shows no signiﬁcant change
in the number of lenders by market and type in the Philadelphia market compared
with the rest of the state. The fraction of lenders in the subprime and non-bank
categories declined by similar amounts in Philadelphia and the control group over
the pre- and post-law periods. Unlike the Chicago results, the Philadelphia loan
origination data show a slower decline in bank lending than in the control group.
Panel C of Exhibit 4 shows that the bank-afﬁliated share of origination volume
in the Philadelphia subprime market declined by 18.3%, compared with a larger













































Exhibit 3  Lenders and Originations by Lender Type in the Pre- and Post-Legislation Periods
Pre-Law Post-Law
Number of Percentage Number of Percentage
Number of Percentage Non-bank Non-bank Number of Percentage Non-bank Non-bank
Number of Subprime Subprime Subprime Subprime Number of Subprime Subprime Subprime Subprime
Market Lenders Lenders Lenders (%) Lenders Lenders (%) Lenders Lenders Lenders (%) Lenders Lenders (%)
Panel A1: Illinois Number of Lenders by Lender Type
Number of Lenders
Chicago 641 106 16.54 75 11.70 643 95 14.77 68 10.58
Control Group 1,049 119 11.34 86 8.20 1,028 105 10.21 75 7.30
Growth Rates
Chicago 0.31% 10.38% 9.33%
Control Group 2.00% 11.76% 12.79%
Panel B1: Pennsylvania Number of Lenders by Lender Type
Philadelphia 536 76 14.18 48 8.96 556 70 12.59 46 8.27
Control Group 690 80 11.59 49 7.10 750 79 10.53 51 6.80
Growth Rates
Philadelphia
Control Group 3.73% 7.89% 11.21% 4.17% 7.61%492  Harvey and Nigro










Panel A: Chicago Subprime Market Originations
Originations
Pre-law 7,399 3,627 49.02 3,772 50.98
Post-law 6,026 2,739 45.45 3,287 54.55
Change 1,373 888 3.57 485 3.57
Control Group
Pre-law 13,675 6,275 45.89 7,400 54.11
Post-law 11,607 5,450 46.95 6,157 53.05
Change 2,068 825 1.07 1,243 1.07
Growth Rates
Chicago 18.56% 24.48% 12.86%
Control Group 15.12% 13.15% 16.80%
Difference 3.43% 11.34% 3.94%
Panel B: Philadelphia Subprime Market Originations
Originations
Pre-law 7,488 5,081 67.86 2,407 32.14
Post-law 6,857 3,399 49.57 3,458 50.43
Change 631 1,682 18.29 1,051 18.29
Control Group
Pre-law 12,478 8,197 65.69 4,281 34.31
Post-law 13,714 6,031 43.98 7,683 56.02
Change 1,236 2,166 21.71 3,402 21.71
Growth Rates
Chicago 8.43% 33.10% 43.66%
Control Group 9.91% 26.42% 79.47%
Difference 18.33% 6.68% 35.80%
shown in Panel D, these declines in bank share were roughly equal at 2.8% and
3.3%, respectively. These results show that after comparing the Philadelphia
subprime experience with the rest of the state and with the prime market, the
city’s subprime market did not experience the relative contraction in bank-afﬁliated
lending share that was observed in the Chicago subprime market.
 Empirical Methods
Applicant-level logistic regression models were used to examine the impact of the
Chicago and Philadelphia predatory lending laws on: (1) the probability of a
subprime loan approval; (2) the likelihood of a loan being originated by aPredatory Lending Laws  493
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Exhibit 4  (continued)










Panel C: Chicago Prime Market Originations
Originations
Pre-law 27,018 22,782 84.32 4,236 15.68
Post-law 36,782 30,763 83.64 6,019 16.36
Change 9,764 7,981 0.69 1,783 0.69
Control Group
Pre-law 102,115 85,090 83.33 17,025 16.67
Post-law 149,673 121,104 80.91 28,569 19.09
Change 47,558 36,014 2.42 11,544 2.42
Growth Rates
Chicago 36.14% 35.03% 42.09%
Control Group 46.57% 42.32% 67.81%
Difference 10.43% 7.29% 25.71%
Panel D: Philadelphia Prime Market Originations
Originations
Pre-law 43,871 33,703 76.82 10,168 23.18
Post-law 78,460 58,043 73.98 20,417 26.02
Change 34,589 24,340 2.85 10,249 2.85
Control Group
Pre-law 78,071 66,327 84.96 11,744 15.04
Post-law 133,362 108,832 81.61 24,530 18.39
Change 55,291 42,505 3.35 12,786 3.35
Growth Rates
Philadelphia 78.84% 72.22% 100.80%
Control Group 70.82% 64.08% 108.87%
Difference 8.02% 8.14% 8.08%
subprime versus a prime lender; and (3) the likelihood of a loan being originated
by a bank versus a non-bank afﬁliated lender. The models control for
characteristics of the applicants and their neighborhoods, and include geographic
and time binary variables to test for changes occurring in each market post-
legislation.
Denial Probabilities
The applicant-level logit models for denial probabilities in the subprime market
in Illinois and Pennsylvania are speciﬁed as Equations 1 and 2, respectively:494  Harvey and Nigro
DENY     CHICAGO   POSTLAW 12
  CHICPOST   INCOME   LOAN2INC 34 5
  CENSUS. (1) 6
DENY     PHIL   POSTLAW   PHILPOST 12 3
  INCOME   LOAN2INC   CENSUS. (2) 45 6
The dependent variable is a binary coded 1 for a rejection and 0 for an approval.
The explanatory variables in the model control for characteristics of the applicants
and their neighborhoods. These are applicant income as reported on the loan
application (INCOME), the applicant’s loan-to-income ratio (LOAN2INC) and
several features of the applicant’s census tract (CENSUS), as detailed in the
variable deﬁnitions in Exhibit 5. A negative coefﬁcient is expected on INCOME,
since higher incomes lower the likelihood of denial, while a positive sign is
expected on the debt burden ratio LOAN2INC. Applicants from census tracts with
less favorable characteristics are more likely to be denied loans. Finally, the model
includes time and geographic market binary and interactive variables. The binary
variable CHICAGO (PHIL) is coded 1 for Chicago (Philadelphia) applications and
zero for applications taken from the rest of the state. POSTLAW is coded 1 for all
applications taken during the post-legislation period and 0 otherwise, to test
whether the probability of a loan approval is different across the two periods. The
most important test variable is CHICPOST (PHILPOST), which interacts with the
CHICAGO (PHIL) and POSTLAW variables to test for a shift in denial
probabilities in Chicago (Philadelphia) post-legislation compared with the control
group. The latter three variables are included in each of the models that follow as
well. All variable deﬁnitions are contained in Exhibit 4.
Subprime Origination Probabilities
The second model tests whether a loan is likely to be made at a subprime versus
a traditional lender after controlling for characteristics of the applicant and census
tract. The Illinois and Pennsylvania models are given by Equations 3 and 4,
respectively:
SUBPRIME     CHICAGO   POSTLAW 12
  CHICPOST   INCOME 34
  LOAN2INC   CENSUS. (3) 56Predatory Lending Laws  495
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Exhibit 5  Variable Deﬁnitions
Variables Deﬁnition
HMDA Variables
DENIAL Indicator variable 1 if denied; 0 otherwise
INCOME Applicant income reported on HMDA
LOAN2INC Ratio of requested loan amount to applicant income
NON-BANK Indicator variable 1 if non-regulated institution; 0 if
regulated, i.e., bank, thrift and credit union
Census Variables
MEDINC Median income in the applicant MSA
% MINORITY Percentage of Minorities in the applicant MSA
% PUBLIC Percentage of Families on Public Assistance in the
applicant MSA
% RENTAL In the applicant MSA
% VACANT In the applicant MSA
% FEMALEHH Percentage of female head of households in the
applicant MSA
AGEHOUSE Average age of the housing stock
Variables Isolating Chicago/Philadelphia
and Effects of Legislation
CHICAGO
PHIL
Indicator variable: Chicago  1; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable: Philadelphia  1; 0 otherwise
POSTLAW Indicator variable: Time period post Chicago
(Philadelphia) legislation  1; 0 otherwise
CHICPOST Indicator variable: post legislation in Chicago  1; 0
otherwise
PHILPOST Indicator variable: post legislation in Philadelphia 
1; 0 otherwise
Note: 1990 Census information was used for the Census variables due to the lack of availability
of 2000 Census information at the MSA level.
SUBPRIME     PHIL   POSTLAW   PHILPOST 12 3
  INCOME   LOAN2INC 45
  CENSUS. 6 (4)
The dependent variable is coded 1 for subprime originations and zero for non-
subprime loan originations. Applicants with weaker incomes and higher loan-to-
income ratios are considered more likely to seek a loan from a subprime lender,496  Harvey and Nigro
as are applicants from census tracts with less favorable characteristics. The models
also include the same binary and interactive variables that control for timing
(POSTLAW) and geographic market (CHICAGO and PHIL) effects. As in the ﬁrst
model, the most important variable is the interaction of POSTLAW with the
geographic variables (Chicago and Phil) to test for a shift in subprime lending
post-legislation in each geographic market.
Bank Affiliation Effects
The third model tests whether loan applicants are more likely to get their loan
from a bank versus a non-bank lender in each geographic market pre- and post-
legislation. Results of the tests are provided for both the subprime and prime
markets in each geography. The Illinois and Pennsylvania models are given by
Equations 5 and 6, respectively:
NON-BANK     CHICAGO   POSTLAW 12
  CHICPOST   INCOME 34
  LOAN2INC   CENSUS. (5) 56
NON-BANK     PHIL   POSTLAW 12
  PHILPOST   INCOME 34
  LOAN2INC   CENSUS. (6) 56
The dependent variable is coded 1 for loan originations at non-bank lenders and
0 for bank-afﬁliated lenders.22 INCOME is expected to be inversely related to
NON-BANK since lower income applicants may be more likely to rely on non-
traditional providers of credit.23 A positive sign is expected for the LOAN2INC
variable for the same reason, while applicants from neighborhoods with less
favorable census tract characteristics may also rely more heavily on non-traditional
credit sources. The model includes the same binary and interactive variables as
the ﬁrst two models to test for a shift in bank versus non-bank lending post-
legislation.
 Multivariate Analysis Results
The results of each of the multivariate models outlined in the last section are
presented in Exhibit 6. The results for the Illinois and Pennsylvania samples are
contained in Panels A and B, respectively. This section discusses the results of













































Exhibit 6  Multivariate Analysis
Non-bank vs. Non-bank vs.
Denial of Subprime vs. Bank Origination Bank Origination
Dependent Variable Subprime Loan Prime Origination Subprime Market Prime Market
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Panel A: Illinois
INTERCEPT 0.1297*** 0.0154 1.7916*** 0.0001 0.1004 0.1342 1.8908*** 0.0001
CHICAGO 0.0355* 0.0990 0.2293*** 0.0001 0.1267** 0.0346 0.1614*** 0.0001
POSTLAW 0.0584*** 0.0002 0.4692*** 0.0001 0.3404*** 0.0001 0.0882*** 0.0001
CHICPOST 0.0133 0.6079 0.1047*** 0.0001 0.1854*** 0.0001 0.0353 0.1694
INCOME 0.0022*** 0.0001 0.0050*** 0.0001 0.0018*** 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0001
LOAN2INC 0.0254*** 0.0001 0.0176*** 0.0001 0.0030 0.1284 0.2263*** 0.0001
MEDINC 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.6486 0.0001*** 0.0062
% MINORITY 0.0012*** 0.0001 0.0113*** 0.0001 0.0019*** 0.0001 0.0069*** 0.0001
% PUBLIC 0.0030** 0.0318 0.0018 0.2221 0.0096*** 0.0001 0.0201*** 0.0001
% RENTAL 0.0016 0.7338 0.0108*** 0.0001 0.0016*** 0.0063 0.0018*** 0.0001
% VACANT 0.0023 0.1924 0.0013 0.4216 0.0099*** 0.0001 0.0089*** 0.0001
% FEMALEHH 0.0056*** 0.0002 0.0421*** 0.0001 0.0012 0.5656 0.0200*** 0.0001
AGEHOUSE 0.0032*** 0.0001 0.0075*** 0.0001 0.0027*** 0.0016 0.0078*** 0.0001


















Exhibit 6  (continued)
Multivariate Analysis
Non-bank vs. Non-bank vs.
Denial of Subprime vs. Bank Origination Bank Origination
Dependent Variable Subprime Loan Prime Origination Subprime Market Prime Market
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Panel B: Pennsylvania
INTERCEPT 0.0138 0.7927 1.9444*** 0.0001 0.6244*** 0.0001 2.8214*** 0.0001
PHIL 0.0029 0.8912 0.0209 0.2692 0.0597 0.1005 0.3756*** 0.0001
POSTLAW 0.3829*** 0.0001 0.3404*** 0.0001 0.9176*** 0.0001 0.1847*** 0.0001
PHILPOST 0.0842*** 0.0007 0.0982*** 0.0001 0.0832* 0.0616 0.0697*** 0.0004
INCOME 0.0013*** 0.0001 0.0049*** 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001
LOAN2INC 0.1082*** 0.0001 0.0214*** 0.0001 0.0514*** 0.0001 0.3864*** 0.0001
MEDINC 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001
% MINORITY 0.0021*** 0.0001 0.0088*** 0.0001 0.0004 0.5529 0.0036*** 0.0001
% PUBLIC 0.0004 0.8290 0.0032* 0.0537 0.0108*** 0.0004 0.0230*** 0.0001
% RENTAL 0.0004 0.4406 0.0041*** 0.0001 0.0005 0.5517 0.0050*** 0.0001
% VACANT 0.0013 0.2952 0.0037*** 0.0018 0.0011 0.6456 0.0062*** 0.0001
% FEMALEHH 0.0030* 0.0957 0.0253*** 0.0001 0.0077** 0.0238 0.0211*** 0.0001
AGEHOUSE 0.0006 0.3121 0.0132*** 0.0001 0.0032*** 0.0047 0.0043*** 0.0001
2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 168009*** 1567284*** 1060512*** 309107***
Notes: Logistic regression analysis where the dependent binary variables are coded 1 for: (1) denial of a subprime loan (versus approval); (2) subprime
loan originations (versus prime origination); (3) non-bank subprime origination (versus bank); and (4) non-bank prime origination (versus bank).
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.Predatory Lending Laws  499
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Denial Probabilities
The results of the model predicting the likelihood of denial in the subprime market
are provided in column 1 of Exhibit 6. Panel A shows that for the Illinois market
denial probabilities were lower in Chicago overall, as indicated by the negative
coefﬁcient on CHICAGO. The coefﬁcient on POSTLAW is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, indicating an increase in denial probabilities in the post-legislation
period for the entire sample. The key test variable, CHICPOST, is not signiﬁcant,
which conﬁrms that there was no signiﬁcant shift in denial rates in Chicago
relative to the control group following enactment of the predatory lending law.
The Pennsylvania results in Panel B of Exhibit 6 show that the variable PHIL is
not signiﬁcant, indicating there was no signiﬁcant difference in subprime denial
probabilities in Philadelphia as compared with the control group across the entire
period. The variable POSTLAW is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
indicating an increase in subprime denial rates across both geographies post-
legislation, consistent with the increases described in the Exhibit 2 descriptive
statistics. The data in Exhibit 2 indicate that denial rates increased slightly in the
Philadelphia subprime market relative to the control group post-legislation, while
they decreased in the prime market. The coefﬁcient on the test variable PHILPOST
in Exhibit 6 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which conﬁrms the relative
increase in Philadelphia subprime denial rates post-legislation found in Exhibit 2,
after controlling for applicant and census tract characteristics.
Subprime Origination Probabilities
Column 2 in Exhibit 6 provides the results of the model predicting the likelihood
of a loan being originated by a subprime versus a prime lender (Equations 5 and
6). Panel A contains the results for the Illinois market. The control variables
INCOME and LOAN2INC are signiﬁcant and have the expected signs, as do four
of the ﬁve signiﬁcant census variables. The coefﬁcient on CHICAGO is negative
and signiﬁcant after controlling for these factors, despite the higher subprime
shares in Chicago compared with the control group shown in Exhibit 1. The
variable POSTLAW is negative and signiﬁcant, consistent with the decline in
subprime lending in both geographies post-legislation. The coefﬁcient on the test
variable CHICPOST is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, conﬁrming that
the likelihood of a loan being subprime declined less in Chicago compared with
the control group post-legislation. This is consistent with the difference in growth
rates found in the Exhibit 2 data, which show that the relative contraction in the
Chicago subprime market (3.4%) was less than that in the prime market
(10.4%). These results are explored in greater detail below in the section dealing
with bank-afﬁliation effects.
The Panel B results in Exhibit 6 show that the variable PHIL is not signiﬁcant,
indicating no signiﬁcant difference in subprime shares across the Pennsylvania
geographical groupings. The variable POSTLAW is negative and signiﬁcant,500  Harvey and Nigro
consistent with the overall decline in subprime shares found in Exhibit 1. The key
test variable PHILPOST is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This ﬁnding
indicates a decline in the likelihood of a loan being originated by a subprime
lender in Philadelphia post-legislation, compared with the control group. This
result, combined with the relative increase in denial rates, suggests that the
proposed legislation in Philadelphia may have impacted the marketing and
underwriting of subprime loans in the city.
Bank versus Non-bank Effects
Columns 3 and 4 of Exhibit 6 contain the results for the model predicting the
likelihood of a loan being originated by a non-bank versus a bank (depository)
lender. Column 3 provides the results for the subprime market, while column 4
provides those for the prime market as a basis of comparison. These results are
especially important for the Illinois market, since the impact of the legislation in
that state was felt by depository institutions only. Column 3 in Panel A shows
that CHICAGO is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that in the subprime market
a loan was less likely to be originated by a non-bank lender in Chicago as
compared with the control group across both time periods. The variable POSTLAW
is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating an increase in non-bank subprime lending
post-legislation for the entire sample. The coefﬁcient on the key test variable,
CHICPOST, is positive and signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with the Exhibit
3 data, which shows a shift away from bank subprime lending in Chicago as
compared with the rest of the state post-legislation. The results for the prime
market in Column 4 are used to put this change in context. Here the coefﬁcient
on CHICPOST is negative and insigniﬁcant. This result is opposite that in the
subprime market and is also consistent with the Exhibit 3 data. Taken together,
these ﬁndings show that the Chicago law had a unique impact on bank-afﬁliated
lenders in the subprime market.
To test the robustness of these ﬁndings and further investigate the results of
Equation 3, which predicts the likelihood of a loan being subprime, the equation
for the bank and non-bank samples were re-estimated separately. Columns 1 and
2 of Exhibit 7 provide the results for the bank and non-bank samples, respectively.
In the bank market results in column 1, the coefﬁcient on CHICPOST is negative
and insigniﬁcant. In the column 2 results for the non-bank market, this coefﬁcient
is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These ﬁndings indicate that the smaller
relative contraction in the Chicago subprime market, which resulted in a positive
coefﬁcient on the variable CHICPOST in the original Equation 1, was due to
increased lending by non-bank lenders that were not affected by the new
legislation. This ﬁnding provides further support for the hypothesis that banks
were uniquely affected by the Chicago legislation.
Turning to the Philadelphia market, although the provisions of the Philadelphia
law affected banks and non-banks equally, as discussed earlier, non-bank lendersPredatory Lending Laws  501
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INTERCEPT 2.3317*** 0.0001 0.3315*** 0.0001
CHICAGO 0.1505*** 0.0001 0.1859*** 0.0001
POSTLAW 0.4547*** 0.0001 0.5198*** 0.0001
CHICPOST 0.0176 0.6249 0.2528*** 0.0001
INCOME 0.0052*** 0.0001 0.0041*** 0.0001
LOAN2INC 0.0135*** 0.0001 0.1382*** 0.0001
MEDINC 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001
% MINORITY 0.0111*** 0.0001 0.0084*** 0.0001
% PUBLIC 0.0003 0.8935 0.0041* 0.0914
% RENTAL 0.0113*** 0.0001 0.0104*** 0.0001
% VACANT 0.0013 0.5655 0.0043 0.1040
% FEMALEHH 0.0445*** 0.0001 0.0282*** 0.0001
AGEHOUSE 0.0049*** 0.0001 0.0142*** 0.0001
Notes: Logistic regression analysis where the dependent binary variables are coded 1 for a
subprime origination (versus prime). The dependent variable is subprime vs. prime origination.
Column 1 contains observations for loans made by depository institutions while column 2 contains
those for loans made by non-banks.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
**Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
***Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
may be more likely to underwrite loans that could be subject to the new criteria.
The results in column 3 of Panel B in Exhibit 6 do show a reduction in the
likelihood of a subprime loan being originated by a non-bank in Philadelphia
compared with the control group, as indicated by the negative coefﬁcient on
PHILPOST, which is signiﬁcant a the 10% level. This variable is also negative
and signiﬁcant in the column 4 results for the prime market. Thus, there was no
apparent unique impact on non-bank lending in the subprime market in
Philadelphia.
Income and Racial Classification Effects
The examination of growth rate differentials in the Pennsylvania market in Exhibit
1 revealed that both low-income and minority loan applicants experienced502  Harvey and Nigro
contractions in subprime lending volume compared with the rest of the state after
enactment of the legislation. By contrast, in Chicago low-income applicants
appeared to have fared worse in the subprime market than minority applicants.
Equations 3 and 4 were re-estimated to examine the effects of the legislation in
both cities on the likelihood of low-income and minority applicants receiving a
subprime versus a prime loan origination. Binary indicator variables were added
for applicant income (LOWINC) and race (MINORITY) classiﬁcations, where the
criteria used to place applications in these groups are the same as those for the
Exhibit 1 data. These variables were interacted with the CHICPOST (PHILPOST)
variable to test for a unique impact on these groups in the post-legislation period.
The continuous variables measuring applicant income and neighborhood minority
representation are removed from the earlier equations due to their high correlation
with LOWINC and MINORITY. Thus, Equations 3 and 4 become:
SUBPRIME     CHICAGO   POSTLAW 12
  CHICPOST   LOWINC   MINORITY 34 5
  CHICPOST * LOWINC 6
  CHICPOST * MINORITY 7
  LOAN2INC   CENSUS. 89 (7)
SUBPRIME     PHIL   POSTLAW   PHILPOST 12 3
  LOWINC   MINORITY 45
  PHILPOST * LOWINC 6
  PHILPOST * MINORITY 7
  LOAN2INC   CENSUS. 56 (8)
Exhibit 8 contains the results of the estimation of Equations 7 and 8 for the Illinois
and Pennsylvania markets, respectively. For both equations the signs on the
intercept terms LOWINC and MINORITY are positive and signiﬁcant, as expected,
since these groups are more heavily represented in the subprime market than
upper-income and white applicants. In the Illinois market, the interaction of
CHICPOST with MINORITY is positive and signiﬁcant. The interaction for the
variable LOWINC is also signiﬁcant, but with the opposite negative sign, indicating
a contraction in low-income subprime lending. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the Exhibit 1 results, which show that low-income applicants fared worse than
minority applicants in the Chicago subprime market post-legislation. A possible
explanation for this result lies in the differential effects of the legislation in thePredatory Lending Laws  503
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INTERCEPT 3.0237*** 0.0001 3.2325*** 0.0001
CHICAGO 0.1993*** 0.0001
PHIL 0.0119 0.6031
POSTLAW 0.5050*** 0.0001 0.4606*** 0.0001
CHICPOST 0.1132*** 0.0083
PHILPOST 0.0089 0.7894
LOWINC 0.5251*** 0.0001 0.4309*** 0.0001





LOAN2INC 0.0168*** 0.0001 0.0223*** 0.0001
% PUBLIC 0.0008 0.6463 0.0016 0.4665
% RENTAL 0.0068*** 0.0001 0.0010* 0.0936
% VACANT 0.0026 0.1614 0.0028* 0.0813
% FEMALEHH 0.0573*** 0.0001 0.0424*** 0.0001
AGEHOUSE 0.0066*** 0.0006 0.0129*** 0.0001
2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 175396*** 0.0001 144064*** 0.0001
Notes: Logistic regression analysis where the dependent variable is a binary coded 1 for subprime
loan originations (versus prime originations). The columns contain the results for Illinois and
Pennsylvania, respectively. The models include indicator variables for low-income (LOWINC) and
minority applicants, and their interactions with the city post-law indicator variables (CHICPOST
and PHILPOST). The dependent variable is subprime vs. prime origination.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
**Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
***Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
bank versus non-bank markets. To explore this ﬁnding further, the same approach
as in the models shown in Table 6 was used to re-estimate the equations for the
bank and non-bank samples separately. The results, not shown here, indicate the
low-income interaction is negative and signiﬁcant for the bank sample only, where
the Chicago law is expected to have had its impact in reducing subprime lending.
For the non-bank sample, this interaction variable is not nearly signiﬁcant.24 Thus,504  Harvey and Nigro
a contraction in bank subprime lending in Chicago was not sufﬁciently offset by
non-bank lending for low-income borrowers.
The results for Pennsylvania indicate that both low-income and minority borrowers
were negatively impacted in the subprime market. The coefﬁcients on both
interaction terms, LOWINC and MINORITY, are negative and signiﬁcant.
PHILPOST, which now measures the effect on applicants who are neither low-
income or minority, is no longer signiﬁcant, showing that the contraction in
subprime lending was felt most by the low-income and minority groups.
 Conclusion
This study examined the impact of two city-level predatory lending laws passed
in Chicago and Philadelphia. The impact of the localized legislation on denial
rates, subprime originations and the impact on different types of lenders in the
two cities relative to other parts of the states from the pre- to post-legislation
periods were evaluated. This study is the ﬁrst to examine how city-level predatory
lending laws impact mortgage activity. The ﬁndings are consistent with results
from previous studies on predatory lending laws.
In Chicago, where the predatory lending law focused on banks, the ﬁndings
indicate that a subprime origination in the city was less likely to be made by a
bank after the passage of the law when compared to the rest of the state. Thus,
the legislation did have an impact on its stated target. Non-banks in Chicago,
however, appeared to ﬁll the vacuum left by their bank counterparts, as the overall
likelihood of a loan being originated by a subprime lender increased in the city
relative to the rest of the state during the post-legislation period. This impact of
the legislation was felt only in the subprime market. The Chicago law did not
impact the likelihood of a prime loan being originated by a non-bank lender.
The Philadelphia predatory lending law, unlike their Chicago counterpart, was
aimed at all ﬁnancial service providers, and its provisions were generally
considered to be more severe. In Philadelphia, the volume of subprime mortgage
lending declined signiﬁcantly when compared to the rest of the state following
the enactment of the predatory lending law. An examination of the results by race
and income classes indicates that minority and low-income applicants were
affected to a greater degree than majority applicants.
The results from both cities show signiﬁcant declines in subprime mortgage
activity, of which a portion is likely predatory in nature. Given the magnitude of
these declines, however, it is very possible that the city-level predatory laws also
have had an adverse impact on legitimate subprime lending. These results suggest
that policymakers need to ensure that any future predatory legislation be more
narrowly focused to deter only those lenders actually engaging in predatory
practices. As predatory lending laws become more effective, it is likely that
predatory lenders will seek to relocate to areas where they are less likely to be
targets for predatory legislation. Thus, city-level and even state-level predatoryPredatory Lending Laws  505
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lending legislation enacted in the U.S. during the past few years may actually
redistribute where predatory lending occurs, as opposed to eliminating it. This
suggests that policymakers should consider a national predatory lending law to
preclude these lenders from targeting geographies that lack effective deterrents.
Much more thought, however, has to be given to how such legislation could more
narrowly target predatory lenders.25
Future research should attempt to disentangle how much of the subprime lending
in the two cities is predatory in nature. This would require a data set that includes
more information on pricing and applicant credit-worthiness or more detailed
information on the lenders operating in the area. Finally, future research could
also examine the impact of more recent predatory lending statutes in other cities,
such as Los Angeles and Detroit, to determine the robustness of the results and
whether different provisions lead to smaller or larger declines in subprime lending.
 Endnotes
1 See the HUD/Treasury (2000) joint study on subprime lending.
2 The Federal Reserve broadened the scope of HOEPA in December 2001. The goal of
the expansion was to curb some of the most ﬂagrant predatory lending abuses without
impairing the growth of legitimate subprime lending. See Remarks by Governor Edward
M. Gramlich, at the Housing Bureau for Seniors Conference, January 2002.
3 For example, in 2000 North Carolina was the ﬁrst state to implement a predatory lending
law. See Harvey and Nigro (2002) and Elliehausen and Staten (2002) for more details.
More recently, Georgia passed what many consider the most stringent predatory lending
law. See American Banker, October 1, 2002 ‘‘Georgia Predator Law Drives Out Some
Lenders,’’ for more details on the Georgia predatory lending law.
4 The Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2002, introduced by Senator
Sarbanes, Chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, would
implement a national predatory lending law, while Representative Ney (R-OH)
anticipates introducing on January 7, 2003, the ﬁrst day of the 108th Congress the
Responsible Lending Act, which would be a vehicle for consideration of federal
preemption of state and local predatory lending laws.
5 For example, several HUD studies (2000) show the predominance of subprime lenders
role in inner cities such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Los Angeles and New York.
6 For a discussion of lenders who left the Philadelphia market during the time period of
the imposition of the predatory lending law, see ‘‘Stiff Predator Laws Lead Lenders to
Exit,’’ American Banker, June 11, 2001.
7 For example, if a borrower cannot obtain a loan from any other source other than a
subprime lender charging 300 basis points above other lenders in the area, but desires
and has the ability to repay the loan—is this a predatory loan?
8 Stein (2001) estimates the costs to consumers of these predatory practices at over $9.1
billion annually.
9 The banking regulators designate a ‘‘subprime’’ borrower as having one of the following
characteristics: two or more 30-day delinquencies; one or more 60-day delinquencies in
the last 24 months; judgment, foreclosure, repossession or charge-off in the prior 24506  Harvey and Nigro
months; bankruptcy in the last 5 years; a high default probability as measured by a credit
score of 660 or below; or a debt-to-income ratio of 50% or greater. See OCC Bulletin
2001-6.
10 Zorn (2000) ﬁnds that up to 100 basis points of the rates charged by subprime lenders
could not be explained by credit risk of the borrowers.
11 Subprime loans are also typically smaller in size, which make the associated fees not
only greater in absolute amounts but also as a percentage of the loan amount.
12 The names, identiﬁcation numbers and methodology to identify subprime home lenders
compiled are outlined in Scheessele (1998). See http://www.huduser.org/datasets/
manu.html for lenders on the annual list.
13 Speciﬁcally, the study found that African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately
represented in the subprime lending market and that these patterns persist across all
income levels and throughout the nation.
14 The Chicago predatory lending law was the footprint for the state law passed in mid-
April 2001. See the Mortgage Bankers Association site on predatory at http://
www.mbaa.org/resources/predlend for more information on the status of predatory
lending laws in Illinois and the rest of the U.S.
15 This currently equals roughly an 11% mortgage rate or total fees and points exceeding
more than 4% of the loan amount.
16 The city says that more than 40% of repossessions last year were the result of subprime
loans, up from 15% in 1993 (see American Banker, April 24, 2000).
17 The passage of the Chicago ordinance came after ﬁve months of negotiations with the
banking industry that wanted to narrow the predatory lending guidelines deﬁned by the
council (see American Banker, August 31, 2000).
18 The institutions impacted range in size from $651 billion-asset Bank of America Corp.
to $48 million-asset Community Bank of Lawndale (see American Banker, April 20,
2000).
19 See American Banker, June 15, 2001, ‘‘Stiff Predator Laws Lead Lenders to Exit,’’ that
states that ‘‘. . . ten different lenders who have already left the market’’ prior to
implementation and that numerous more planned to pull out of the city.
20 The remainder of 2001 is excluded from the Illinois data, since a state-level predatory
law passed in the second quarter of 2001.
21 The subprime lender list is comprised of all subprime lenders who primarily engage in
this activity. Thus, the list omits some prime lenders who may have a small subprime
portfolio, as well as some identiﬁed subprime lenders who are active on the prime
market.
22 The HMDA data includes ‘‘agency’’ codes that permits us to separate out banks from
non-banks.
23 See Vermilyea and Wilcox (2002) for a discussion of ‘‘banked and unbanked’’
consumers.
24 In the bank sample, the p-value for the low-income interaction variable is .0005, while
in the non-bank sample it is .6932.
25 The Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency recently proposed guidance for ﬂexible
national guidelines on predatory lending, as opposed to regulation, arguing that strict
rules might inadvertently outlaw useful loan features and that any framework to reducePredatory Lending Laws  507
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predatory practices needs to be done on a national level (see Washington Post, February
22, 2003, p. E01).
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